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Abstract
In this note we theoretically investigate the question of whether the relationship
between public debt and economic growth is characterized by an inverse U-shaped
functional form. Starting point of our analysis is the paper by Checherita-Westphal
et al. (2012) who present an endogenous growth model with public capital and public
debt that displays a hump-shaped relation between debt and economic growth.
We highlight the mechanism that generates this outcome and we generalize their
model by allowing for a more general debt policy. We demonstrate that this non-
monotonic relation only holds if public deficits are exogenously fixed and exactly
equal to public investment at each point in time. With a more general debt policy,
one realizes that smaller public deficits and lower public debt always lead to a higher
balanced growth rate. Thus, starting from a situation where the public deficit equals
public investment, governments can raise the long-run growth rate by reducing their
deficits.
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1. Introduction
The current public debt crisis in some member countries of the euro area raises the
question of how public debt and economic growth are correlated. From an empirical point
of view there is evidence that this relation is described by an inverted U-shaped pattern.
First, higher public debt to GDP ratios go along with higher GDP growth rates before
the relation becomes negative, implying that there is a growth maximizing public debt to
GDP ratio. For example, Checherita and Rother (2010) as well as Reinhart und Rogoff
(2010) find empirical evidence for such a functional form. However, that result is far from
being robust since one can also find studies that detect a strictly negative correlation
between the debt to GDP ratio and economic growth (see for example Ferreira 2009 or
Kumar and Woo 2011).
From a theoretical perspective, the relation between the public debt to GDP ratio and
economic growth seems to be rather characterized by a negative correlation. There exist
studies resorting to standard endogenous growth models with an infinitely lived represen-
tative household that come to this result. For example, Futagami et al. (2008) present
an endogenous growth model with productive public spending and public debt where the
government is not allowed to raise the debt to GDP ratio beyond a certain critical value.
For that model, it turns out that the balanced growth rate is the higher the smaller
the public debt to GDP ratio is, although those authors do not mention this outcome
explicitly since they are primarily interested in the dynamics of their model. Greiner
(2008) presents an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt where
the government sets the primary surplus such that the inter-temporal budget constraint
of the government is fulfilled. In that model, it turns out that a zero debt to GDP ratio
implies a higher balanced growth rate compared to a situation with a positive debt ratio.
An asymptotically zero debt to GDP ratio can be obtained either through a balanced
government budget or through public deficits that imply a positive growth rate of public
debt that, however, is smaller than the growth rate of GDP. Minea and Villieu (2009)
also present an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt and posit
that the government is allowed to run deficits only in order to finance public investment,
that is the government obeys the ’golden rule of public finance’. They find that a bal-
anced budget rule yields a higher growth rate than an economy where the government
runs permanent deficits and, erroneously, conclude that the ’golden rule of public finance’
implies a smaller long-run growth rate than the balanced budget rule. Their conclusion is
not correct since it is not the ’golden rule of public finance’ that generates the result, but
rather the fact public debt grows at the same rate as GDP. Thus, it can be shown that
the ’golden rule of public finance’ and the balanced budget rule give identical long-run
growth rates when public debt grows but less than GDP (see Greiner 2010 for details).
The fact that public debt and economic growth are negatively correlated can also be
observed for endogenous growth models without productive public spending. For example,
Greiner (2011) presents an endogenous growth model with elastic labour supply where
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ongoing growth results from positive externalities of private capital. In that model public
debt and economic growth are negatively correlated, too. It must also be pointed out that
it is not the standard crowding-out mechanism that generates this outcome because, as the
debt ratio rises, the primary surplus rises, too, to guarantee sustainabilty. Consequently,
for a fixed tax rate public spending declines, thus, preventing a crowding-out of private
investment. Rather, the decline in the growth rate, as a consequence of higher public debt,
is due to the fact that higher public debt leads to a lower shadow price of savings which
reduces labour supply and investment. However, once incomplete markets are assumed,
things change. For example, if the labour market is characterized by wage rigidities,
leading to unemployment, public debt is neutral in the sense that it does not affect the
allocation of resources ceteris paribus (see Greiner 2012). Then, a higher debt ratio can
lead to higher growth and less unemployment if the deficit is used for productive public
investment, as shown in Greiner and Flaschel (2010) with the help of numerical examples.
However, an inverted U-shaped relation between debt and growth does not exist, but the
growth rate rises until the economy reaches the full employment state.
In a recent contribution, Checherita-Westphal et al. (2012) present an endogenous
growth model with public capital and public debt and find an inverted U-shaped relation
between debt and growth and they estimate the growth maximizing debt to GDP ratios
for OECD, EU and euro area countries. We demonstrate that their model is structurally
the same as the model without public debt that is characterized by an inverted U-shaped
relation between the tax rate and growth. Since they assume that the deficit is exogenously
fixed and equal to public investment at each point in time, the debt ratio equals the ratio
of public capital to GDP that is a monotonic function of the tax rate in equilibrium. But,
once the model is generalized to allow for different deficit policies, we find that the growth
rate is the higher the smaller public deficits and public debt are.
In the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows. In the next section we present the
model which is analyzed and discussed in section 3. Section 4, finally, concludes the paper.
2. The growth model with public capital and debt
We begin our presentation with a description of the structure of the growth model with
public capital and debt that extends the model by Checherita-Westphal et al. (2012).
2.1 The private sector
There exists a continuum of rational and identical households that maximize utility over
an infinite time horizon arising from per-capita consumption, C(t), subject to the budget
constraint. Population is constant and set equal to one. Neglecting the time argument t
when no ambiguity arises, the maximization problem of the representative household can
be written as,
max
C
∫
∞
0
e−ρt lnC dt, (1)
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subject to
K˙ + B˙ = rB + (1− τ)Y − C. (2)
The coefficient ρ is the household’s rate of time preference, r is the interest rate and we
assume a logarithmic utility function without loss of generality.1 The variable Y gives
GDP which is equal to output in the economy, K denotes private capital where we neglect
depreciation and B denotes public debt. Finally, τ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant tax rate on
output and the dot over a variable stands for the time derivative.
Output Y is given by
Y = AK1−αGα, (3)
with α ∈ (0, 1) the elasticity of output with respect to private capital and 1 − α is the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital, G, and A is a technology parameter.
In equilibrium, the interest rate equals the net marginal product of private capital and is
given by,
r = (1− τ)(1− α)AK−αGα. (4)
2.2 The government
The period budget constraint of the government in our economy is as follows,
B˙ = rB − τY + Ip, (5)
with Ip denoting public investment. Neglecting depreciation, public capital, G, evolves
according to,
G˙ = Ip. (6)
The government obeys the inter-temporal budget constraint such that limt→∞ e
−rtB(t) =
0 holds and it follows the ’golden rule of public finance’ implying that public deficits are
smaller or equal to public investment. The latter gives,
B˙ = ψIp, ψ ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
3. Analysis of the model
Solving the optimization problem of the household and using (4), the growth rate of
consumption, gC , is obtained as,
gC :=
C˙
C
= −ρ+ (1− τ)(1− α)AK−αGα. (8)
1Allowing for a more general CRRA utility function does not change the outcome.
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Further, combining the budget constraint of the household, (2), with that of the govern-
ment, (5), yields the economy-wide resource constraint that determines the growth rate
of private capital as,
gK :=
K˙
K
= A
(
G
K
)α
−
C
K
−
(
Ip
G
)(
G
K
)
. (9)
The growth rates of public debt and of public capital are obtained from (5)-(7) as,
gB :=
B˙
B
= ψ
(
G
K
) (
K
B
) (
G˙
G
)
, (10)
gG :=
G˙
G
= (1− ψ)−1
(
τA
(
G
K
)α−1
− (1− τ)(1− α)A
(
G
K
)α−1
B
K
)
. (11)
To analyze our system further, we define z := G/K, c := C/K and b := B/K. First,
we consider the case ψ = 1 which gives the model studied by Checherita-Westphal et al.
(2012).
3.3 The model for ψ = 1
Setting ψ = 1 and noting that gB = gG = g must hold on the balanced growth path
(BGP), with g denoting the balanced growth rate, we immediately see from equation (10)
that this implies z = b. Further, ψ = 1 also implies B˙ = G˙ and, thus, τY = rB (from (5)
to (7)). Using b = z and (4), τY = rB leads to,
b = z =
τ
(1− τ)
1
(1− α)
. (12)
Equation (12) shows that the ratio of public debt to private capital equals the ratio of
public to private capital on the BGP and is determined by the tax rate. Inserting (12) in
(8) yields the balanced growth rate as,
g = −ρ+ A(1− τ)1−ατα(1− α)1−α . (13)
Equation (13) demonstrates that the balanced growth rate is a hump-shaped function of
the tax rate τ and, because of (12), a hump-shaped function of the debt to capital and
of the public to private capital ratio. Maximizing the balanced growth rate with respect
to τ , shows that the maximum growth rate is achieved for τ = α which is identical to the
result in the model without public debt (see Greiner and Hanusch 1998).
The reason for that outcome is that the assumption of a deficit that equals public
investment at each point in time, gives the budget constraint of the government as τ =
(g+ ρ) · (G/Y ) which is structurally equivalent to that in the model without public debt,
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given by τ = g · (G/Y ). Therefore, the model with public debt is basically the same as
the model without debt, and one obtains the result that the balanced growth rate is a
hump-shaped function of the tax rate and of the ratio of public to private capital which
is equal to the debt ratio. That result only holds for ψ = 1 as we will show next.
3.4 The model for ψ ∈ [0, 1)
For ψ ∈ (0, 1) a BGP is given for gC = gG = gK = gB = g and for ψ = 0 we have b = 0
on the BGP so that in this case the BGP is obtained for gC = gG = gK = g and gB = 0.
Note that in this case, b˙ = b(gB − gK) = 0 holds because of b = 0. Setting g = gB = gG
one obtains zψ = b. Using the latter, we get for q := gC − gG,
q = −ρ+ (1− τ)(1− α)Azα − (1− ψ)−1
(
τAzα−1 − ψ(1− τ)(1− α)Azα
)
. (14)
By implicitly differentiating (14) and using g − r = −ρ, we obtain:
dz
dψ
=
−ρ
(1− ψ) (∂q/∂z)
< 0 . (15)
Equation (8) shows that ∂g/∂z > 0 holds. Hence, equation (15) demonstrates that the
balanced growth rate is the higher, the smaller public deficits and public debt are. The
highest balanced growth rate is obtained for a balanced budget that implies a zero debt to
capital ratio and, for a given tax rate, any value of ψ ∈ [0, 1) generates a higher balanced
growth rate than ψ = 1, which is also seen from (15).
3.5 An example
In order to illustrate our analytical model we now present a numerical example. The
parameter values are set as follows: ρ = 0.05, α = 0.25, τ = 0.15, A = 0.15. Table 1
shows the balanced growth rate and the debt to private capital ratio for different values
of the public deficit.
Table 1. Balanced growth rate (g) and the debt to private capital
. ratio (B/K) for different values of the public deficit (ψ).
. ψ g B/K
0.99999 1.66% 0.235
0.85 1.86% 0.225
0.7 2.07% 0.209
0.5 2.38% 0.178
0.35 2.65% 0.143
0.2 2.94% 0.095
0 3.36% 0
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Table 1 clearly shows that the balanced growth rate is the higher and the debt ratio
is the smaller, the lower the public deficit ψ is chosen.
Setting ψ = 1 leads to a balanced growth rate of g = 1.66% and a corresponding debt
to capital ratio of b = 0.235 for τ = 0.15, which is, of course, identical to the situation
with ψ = 0.99999 in table 1. With ψ = 1, the maximum growth rate is g = 1.89% which
is obtained for τ = 0.25 that implies a debt to capital ratio of z = 0.44444.
This example illustrates the outcome of our analytical model. It clearly demonstrates
that the balanced growth rate is the higher, the smaller public deficits and public debt
are. The highest growth rate is achieved for a balanced budget, i.e. for ψ = 0, that implies
a zero debt ratio and the lowest growth rate is obtained when the public deficit equals
public investment, i.e. for ψ = 1, for a given tax rate.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the inverted U-shaped relation between economic growth
and public debt in the theoretical model by Checherita-Westphal et al. (2012) is the result
of their assumption that the public deficit is exogenously fixed and set such that it is equal
to public investment at each point in time. That makes the stock of public debt identical
to the stock of public capital, relative to private capital or to GDP respectively, and those
two variables are monotonically rising with the tax rate. Since there is a hump-shaped
relation between the tax rate and economic growth in this class of endogenous growth
models with productive public spending, there also exists such a relation between debt
and growth.
However, once a more general debt policy is considered, one finds that smaller public
deficits and lower public debt always generate a higher growth rate. Consequently, starting
from the situation where the public deficit equals public investment, governments can raise
the long-run growth rate by reducing their deficits. Such a policy implies a smaller debt
ratio leading to higher public and private investment in the long-run, thus, raising the
balanced growth rate.2
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